Ledger update: Capital is fleeing.
Visa is scrambling to find a new stablecoin settlement partner after Mastercard pulled the rug from under its feet by acquiring the very firm that had been filling that role. According to documents reviewed by CoinDesk, Visa issued a request for proposal (RFP) targeting a settlement partner and an over-the-counter (OTC) partner, both of which must hold crypto exchange licenses in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. The mandate includes the ability to swap and support a range of stablecoins, with a specific requirement to settle transactions for Open USD – the token Visa named as the first asset on its newly launched Visa Stablecoin Platform.
This is not a routine vendor change. This is a defensive pivot triggered by a direct competitor's move. Mastercard completed its acquisition of BVNK on August 3, 2025 – the same London-based firm that had been processing $12 billion in annualized stablecoin payment volume for Visa since May 2025, when Visa Ventures first invested in it. The acquisition effectively severed Visa's access to its own settlement infrastructure overnight. Mastercard now owns the plumbing.
Alpha dropped: Follow the money.
Visa's own stablecoin platform, announced on July 16 as an enterprise-grade product with wallet infrastructure, minting and burning, dual-control approvals, and audit logging, was built on the assumption that BVNK would remain a neutral settlement layer. That assumption is now dead. The platform entered beta with a small set of clients, meaning the gap is not yet throttling live volume, but the window for a seamless transition is narrow. Whoever wins this mandate will inherit Visa's institutional flow for Open USD – a token that is itself a consortium play backed by Visa, Mastercard, and Stripe.
Here is the core irony: the two card networks are competing on infrastructure while sharing the currency that runs over it. Open USD is a consortium-backed stablecoin designed to be the settlement medium for all three payment giants. Visa needs a settlement partner that can handle Open USD, but Mastercard now controls the previous partner. The RFP makes clear that the new partner must not only support Open USD but also have the ability to swap and support a range of other stablecoins, suggesting Visa is hedging against further concentration risk.
Context: Why now?
BVNK was not just a settlement provider; it was a strategic investment. Visa Ventures' stake in the London firm was a bet on the tokenization of payments. BVNK claimed to process $12 billion in annualized volume, a figure that is modest by Visa's overall scale but significant in the stablecoin corridor. Mastercard's acquisition on August 3 was a surgical strike. It removed a critical piece of Visa's stablecoin infrastructure and forced Visa to either rebuild or find a replacement.
Visa's stablecoin platform, introduced in July, is an enterprise product designed to let banks and fintechs issue and move stablecoins without assembling the stack themselves. The platform includes wallet infrastructure, minting and burning capabilities, dual-control approvals, and audit logging. In the press release, Jack Forestell, Visa's chief product and strategy officer, stated: "Stablecoins are opening up a new layer of programmable money, but for most institutions the hard part isn't the concept, it's the operational reality." That operational reality is now Visa's own problem.
Core: The RFP details and the short list
The RFP, as seen by CoinDesk, calls for a settlement partner and an OTC partner. The license requirements across four jurisdictions (U.S., Canada, U.K., Singapore) are deliberate. These are the key regulatory hubs for cross-border stablecoin flows. The settlement partner must be able to swap and support a range of stablecoins, with a specific focus on Open USD. The OTC partner must have deep liquidity for institutional-sized trades.
Visa has not disclosed who is in the running. It declined to comment to CoinDesk. But the license constraints narrow the field significantly. Few crypto firms hold exchange licenses in all four of those jurisdictions, especially ones that also have the balance sheet and operational maturity to handle Visa's institutional volume.
From my audit experience, I can tell you that the operational complexity of such a mandate is immense. Visa's settlement flows are not just high volume; they are high velocity. The partner must have real-time settlement capabilities, robust compliance frameworks, and the ability to handle multiple stablecoin types simultaneously. The RFP explicitly asks for support for Open USD, but also for other stablecoins, which suggests Visa is building a multi-asset settlement layer, not a single-token dependency.
Contrarian: The trap is not in the RFP; it's in the consortium
The conventional narrative is that Visa is the victim of Mastercard's aggressive acquisition. But the deeper story is that Visa, Mastercard, and Stripe all sit on the same Open USD consortium. This is a rare moment of shared infrastructure in a competitive landscape. The token itself is designed to be the settlement asset for all three networks. If Visa's new partner is unable to handle Open USD efficiently, the entire consortium suffers. Mastercard may have won the battle for BVNK, but it now has a vested interest in the success of Open USD, which requires Visa's volume to maintain liquidity.
This creates a paradox: Mastercard's acquisition may have improved its own infrastructure, but it also introduced a single point of failure for the consortium. Visa's RFP is an attempt to diversify away from that risk. The partner that wins will not just be a settlement layer; it will be a strategic asset that both Visa and Mastercard will need to court.
Another blind spot: the short list likely includes firms that are also competitors to Visa's own platform. For example, a firm like Circle, which issues USDC, could theoretically bid, but that would create a conflict of interest because Circle's USDC competes with Open USD. Similarly, exchanges like Coinbase or Binance have the licenses but lack the neutrality of a pure settlement provider. The RFP's requirement for a range of stablecoins suggests Visa is looking for a neutral aggregator, not a token issuer.
Takeaway: The next 90 days will define the stablecoin settlement landscape
Visa has a narrow window to secure a new partner before the beta expands. The partner that wins will not only handle Visa's flow but will also become the de facto settlement layer for Open USD. This is a pivotal moment for the stablecoin ecosystem. The consortium model is being stress-tested before it even fully launches. Watch for announcements from firms like Fireblocks, Zero Hash, or even a traditional finance player like State Street or BNY Mellon, which are increasingly active in digital asset custody and settlement.
Risk Assessment:
- Operational risk: If Visa's new partner is not fully integrated before the platform scales, settlement delays could erode trust in Open USD and the consortium.
- Regulatory risk: The four-jurisdiction license requirement is a high bar. Any regulatory hiccup in one jurisdiction could delay the entire rollout.
- Competitive risk: Mastercard now has a head start in stablecoin settlement infrastructure. If Visa's alternative partner is slower to integrate, Mastercard could capture more institutional flow.
- Consortium risk: The Open USD consortium depends on all three members (Visa, Mastercard, Stripe) being active. If Visa's settlement issues cause it to deprioritize Open USD, the token's liquidity could suffer.
Forensic forecast: The winning partner will likely be a firm that already has a parallel relationship with Mastercard or Stripe, because the consortium requires interoperability. The partner that can bridge the three networks with minimal friction will win. Expect a bid from a firm like Fireblocks, which already provides settlement infrastructure for multiple exchanges, or a traditional custodian like BNY Mellon that is expanding into crypto.
Final note: Visa's stablecoin platform is a bet on the future of programmable money. The operational reality is that the plumbing is now a competitive battlefield. The next 90 days will reveal who owns the pipes.